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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
ROFESSOR DEBOW' The tOPIC for the fourth and final panel today IS Judicial
Pelections
and campaign finance reform. My name IS Mike DeBow I teach
at the Cumberland Law School at Samford UnIVersity, which IS m Bmnmgham,
Alabama.
If I say the name of my unIversity qUlckly enough, people thmk I live In
Califorma. That IS not the case. I live m Alabama, and that IS why I am mterested
m Judicial selectIOn. It IS really Impossible to live m Alabama WIthOUt formmg
some sort of opmIOn about Judicial selectIOn, and I have one.
I have been teachmg for fifteen years. I have never trIed to teach a class at 2:30
on a FrIday afternoon, and I hope I am never asked to do such a thmg. So for those
of you still with us, I salute you. I appreciate your presence here, particularly the
students who are still With us. That shows a level of self-diSCipline that will stand
you m good stead when you get mto practice.
It IS perhaps mevltable that the question of judicIal campaIgn speech IS followed
by the questIon of Judicial campaIgn finance and the possible reform of that
practice. It certamly IS a tImely Issue for us to take up smce the country seems to
be mterested, to one degree or another anyway, m the current debate over McCamFemgold l and the alternatives to It at the federal level.
The general Issue of money m politics IS a vexmg one for many people. It raises
a number of very mtrIgumg constItutIOnal questIOns, and questIons for varIOUS
SOCial sCientists. In partIcular, the questIOn of causatIOn, I thmk, IS mterestmg here.
Are conservatIve candidates conservative so that they can raise money from
conservatIve donors, or does the causation run the other way around, wIth liberal
donors seekmg out liberal candidates and conservative donors seekmg out
conservatIve candidates? Is It Just that SImple?
In the Judicial realm, the Issue of campaign finance cuts across all states that use
any form of election as part of their selectIon or retentIon system, whether the
electIOns are partisan or non-partisan.
The raIsmg of money for campaIgns IS a task that has to be performed m all states
that use any form of electIon. Like many other thmgs that we have discussed today
It seems to mvolve a sort ofbalancmg act. The state certamly has a strong mterest
m protectmg the mtegrlty of its JudicIary and encouragmg the public perceptIon of
the Judiciary as an mstItutIon of mtegrlty and honor. On the other hand, there are
ObVIOusly First Amendment mterests of the candidates and then contributors to be
taken mto account.
There seem to be three questIOns that we should take up today, to one degree or
another. First of all, what IS the range of current practIce m campaign
fundralSlng-on behalf ofjudicial candidates? Secondly, what, if anythmg, would
be preferable to current practIce? And thirdly, what reforms, if any, would be
constitutIOnally permissible?

1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of2001, S. 27, 107th Congo (2001).
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We have a very distmgulshed panel to help us address these questions. I will
mtroduce them m the order m which they will speak. First to speak will be, to my
far left, Professor Roy Schotland of the Georgetown Law School faculty, who IS a
natIOnally recogmzed expert on Judicial selectIOn.
Most recently, he was the co-convener, with Texas Chief Justice Thomas
Phillips, and the Texas Senate President, Rodney Ellis, of a Chief Justices summit,
which met last December, With seventeen Chief Justices workmg on the problems
of state JudiCial electIOns and producmg some twenty recommendations.
Professor Schotland has been workmg on JudiCial electIOns for almost twenty
years. He IS a graduate of Columbia Umverslty, Oxford Umverslty, and Harvard
Law School. Followmg law school, he clerked for Justice Brennan, worked for a
time m the New York firm of Paul Weiss. He has worked on Capitol Hill and m
several executIve agencies, and m five campaigns, all DemocratIc he tells me. He
has taught also, m additlOn to Georgetown, at the Umverslty of Virgmla Law
School and the Umversity of Pennsylvania Law School. He teaches Admmlstratlve
Law, Electlon Law, and Constitutional Law at Georgetown. We are very pnvileged
to have him wlth us today.
Our second speaker IS Jan Baran, who IS a partner wlth the Washmgton D.C. firm
of Wiley, Rem & Fielding. He IS the head of the firm's electIOn law and
government ethics practice and has been With the firm smce 1985. He IS a graduate
of Ohio Wesleyan Umverslty and Vanderbilt Umverslty Law School.
Among other actiVIties, Mr. Baran has served as the General Counsel of the
Republican National Committee from 1989 to 1992, and the 1988 Bush for
PreSIdent campaign. He has been the Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee
on Election Law and a member of the ABA CommIssIon on Public Financmg of
JudiCial CampaIgns. He IS the author of a book titled The ElectIOn Law PrImer for
CorporatlOns. 2
Finally, I wanted to note that Washzngtonzan Magazzne mcluded him m theIr
1997 Issue m an article entItled, "Heavy Hitters,"3 whIch list the top fifty lawyers
m Washmgton D.C. That IS qUite a recommendatlOn.
To gIve us a view from the Bench, we are pleased to have Justice CraIg Enoch
from the Texas Supreme Court. JustIce Enoch has undergraduate and law degrees
from Southern Methodist Umverslty, and an LL.M. from the Umverslty ofVirgmla
Law School.
He has been a Judge for twenty years, believe It or not. You could not tell that
to look at him, I do not thmk. He began hiS Judicial career on the 10 1st Dlstnct
Court m Dallas County, Texas m 1981, where he served from 1981 to 1987 He
was then Chief JustIce of the Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas from 1987
through 1992. He was then elected to hiS first term on the Texas Supreme Court;
the term began January 1st, 1993. He was reelected m 1998 to a second term.

2. JAN WrrolD BARAN, THE ElECTION LAW PRIMER FOR CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2000).
3. Kim Isaac Eisler, Heavy Hitters: Suddenly Hit with a Subpoena? Served with Divorce
Papers? Facmg an IRS Audit? Here Are the 50 Washmgton Lawyers Who Really Get Results,
WASHINGTON1AN,Feb. 1997, at 70.
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In additIOn, Justice Enoch fulfills many CIVIC and professIOnal roles. He IS,
among other thmgs, currently the Vice-Chairman of the ABA JudicIal DIvIsIon's
Appellate Judges' Conference, and a member of the Amencan Law Institute.
Professor Schotland will begm, followed by Mr. Baran and then Justice Enoch.
Each speaker will speak for fifteen to twenty mmutes. We will follow It up wIth a
questIOn and answer penod.
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: Thanks, Mike. It IS a pnvilege and pleasure to be here
wIth you. I never thought of the Federalist SocIety as meek, but I am authontattvely
told, "The meek shall mhent the earth." And you all sure are mhentmg the earth.
(Laughter.)
The last panel IS a very hard act to follow. Not m the normal sense of they were
good, but I was struck, and maybe you were, that each one was not only persuasive,
but really very appealing. They were appealing guys.
I thmk Lubet was on to somethmg when he notIced that they had not gIven hIm
a name card, because I notIced that I had been put at the far left.
(Laughter.)
By the way, I do not know how many of you notIced that they were all guys, as
we are all guys. I counted It up today and It IS sixteen to three. And maybe you
thmk that IS better than I thmk that IS.
Let me start WIth Sergeant Fnday's approach, whIch IS, if you remember: Just
the Facts. That IS an Important step toward meetmg our problems. I thmk the first
thmg we need to do IS clear away two myths that cloud thiS scene.
The two myths compete. There IS the demal myth, which tries to deny how
hugely electIOn systems dommate our election of state Judges. That competes
agamst the distortIOn myth, whIch tnes to pamt the candidates m these electIons as
panderers who care more about campaIgn contributIOns than about JustIce or
mtegnty
The deOlal myth surfaces all m the tIme m the media coverage of JudiCial
elections. We had several last fall. I remember from the October 1999 Federalist
annual meetmg when you had some very ImpreSSIve whIte papers on "should there
be JudiCIal electIOns or should not there be JudiCial electIOns?"
And they eVidently had not really exchanged the papers before they distributed,
and they could not agree on how many states did or did not have electIOns, and what
kmds of electIons. We get thiS all the tIme.
USA Today thiS fall said there were twenty-one states that elect Judges and State
Supreme Court Jushces. 4 That did not mclude a couple of easily overlooked states:
CalifornIa, Flonda, Indiana, and a number of others. That IS not USA Today's fault,
but the fault of the source from which they get the data.
And The Washmgton Post saId eIght states had partIsan Supreme Court
elections,S whIch IS the same myth-makmg source-the Amencan Judicature
SOCIety IS m demal. There are not eight. There are eleven WIth partisan Supreme
Court electIons, unless you really believe that OhIO IS non-partIsan. And if so, I do
not know what newspapers you read or what you listen to. Or you really believe that
4. See Campaign Contributions Corrupt JudiCial Races, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,2000, at AI6.
5. See George Lardner Jr., Speech Rights and EthiCS Disputed In Judiczal Races, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 2000, at AI3.
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Michigan IS non-partisan. Actually, another one IS Idaho, which was genumely nonpartisan until 1998; and m 1998 and 2000, became partisan.
The demal myth alms at makmg us feel better about Judicial elections by
pretending, counter-factually, that there IS not that much of them. The competmg
myth makes us feel worse about Judicial electIOns by pretending that a great many
of the people who run for the Bench, and therefore have to raise campaign funds,
are mvolved III what IS labeled by a Texas so-called study as "Payola Justice" or III
an OhIO so-called study, "Justice for Sale."
Of all of these studies, I know of only one by my colleague, Steve Ware, which
has the simple mtegnty to put It correctly- Correlation IS not causation.
Let me give Just one example of the distortIOn myth. The attack on the OhIO
Supreme Court by the Amencan Fnends Service Committee of Northern OhiO.
They brought thiS out about fourteen months ago. It got a great deal of mk m the
OhIO press, but not an atom of analysIs. I was actually very disappomted m some
of the Justices who spoke on It. It seems they spoke, Without anythmg m the way
of diggmg mto It.
The study reported what It called the "compliance ratlllgs" of the OhiO Justices;
that IS, how often they would vote for the Side represented by a lawyer who had
made a contribution.
For example, Chief Justice Tom Moyer had a compliance ratmg of74.8%. That
IS three-quarters of the time, he voted with the Side represented by a large
contributor.
And the media seemed to take for granted that if that kmd of analYSIS came from
that kInd of source, about people who raise campaign contributIOns, it must be
sound.
Let me give you Just two facts about the study The method gives, for example
Moyer, a 50% ratIng if, for example, he decided a case, and m that case, on one
Side, the lawyer gave him 50 bucks, and he decides for that Side. And on the other
Side IS a lawyer who gave him 5,000 bucks; he decides agamst that Side, he has got
a 50% compliance ratmg. "The house cannot lose."
Is thiS honest muckraklllg, or IS thiS sheer mudslingmg? One other fact about the
study' they list law firms. And the one that contributed most, that IS, was mvolved
III the largest number of cases III which they made contributIOns, was a law firm
called Atty Gen, A-T-T-Y G-E-N.
(Laughter. )
Now, I tned to clear up Just exactly what the firm IS. And let me say very Simply,
to keep thlllgs polite, that I was rebuffed, "We can't be bothered With these
questIOns."
It appears, gOlllg by the cases m·whlch Atty Gen was on one Side, that these are
the members of the elected Attorney General's Office of OhIO. Now, they do have
substantial docket busmess 10 the high court, and they might even wm some cases.
And SInce It IS an elected office, It IS not surpnsmg that some of them contribute.
The study did not give Just how much they had contributed.
That was about thirty-plus percent of the cases that had Atty Gen on one Side.
You can see what that does to the so-called compliance ratmgs. These awful people
are votmg for the state.
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May I suggest that attackers producmg studies like thiS, and always clalmmg the
moral high ground, lack mtegnty far more clearly than their targets.
Now, I am not saymg there are not campaign finance problems 10 OhIO. A
leading recent example, agam your Supreme Court-a SUlt for damages agamst
Conrail. I do not know how many of you know about the Wightman SUlt.6 A gIrl
was killed by a tram when she drove onto a grade crossmg despite the flashmg
lights and the gates all but barrmg her.
The extensive proceedings mvolved three trials: first, a JUry trial, then a bench
trial for pumtive damages, and then after an appeal, a JUry trial for pumtIves.
Then, there followed another appeal, followed by takmg It to your Supreme
Court. The effort to get your Supreme Court to review the case was sought by both
Sides because the JUry had awarded "pums" of $25 mil, and the tnal Judge had
reduced that to $15 mil.
I assume you would all like to be the plamtiff's lawyer on thiS case. The share
IS better than ten dollars an hour. The plamtiff was represented by a firm that
mclude mne members of the Murray family, Murray and Murray 7
Before the Court agreed three years ago to hear the appeal, two of the Justices
(not mcluding Moyer) got contributIOns from mne of the Murrays, every Murray 10
the firm, and seven Murray spouses.
On February 28th, 1998, the high court deCided to take the appeal. The
contributIOns had come to one Justice on February 9, 1998, for the other Justice
between January 19 and January 21
Every contributIOn complied With the relative legal limits, as did the aggregation
of contributIOns to each Justice. The Justices ran 10 November of 1998. And
according to their post-campaIgn, post-electIOn reports, the contributIOns from thiS
one firm and spouses turned out to be 4.4% of the total pot for one JustIce, 4.7% of
the other's. For each JustIce, they were the largest source of support. Both Justices
participated 10 the oral argument on November 10, 1998. Their reports were filed
one month later.
In January 1999, Conrail filed a motIOn seekmg theIr recusal before a deCISIOn.
In October 1999, Without the Court or either Justice addressmg that motion at that
time, or earlier, or later, the Court deCided 10 favor of the plamtiffs.
Conrail sought certlOran, makmg the contribution pattern one of their major
bases. Cert was demed. 8
We had a Similar concentrated source of support 10 Michigan 10 1998 from one
firm that gave $225,000 to three Democratic candidates. That totaled 29% of one
candidate's total pot; 19% for another. And of the three, the one who got the least,
18%, was a former partner of the firm-sort of Iromc.
Now, OhiO has a $5,000 mdivldual contributton cap, but no caps on the
aggregates from a firm. Texas IS the only state 10 the country that does put a cap on
the aggregate from a firm. By "aggregate from a firm," I mean, partners,
employees, asSOCiates, and any political action committee if affiliated, and so forth.

6. Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail), 86 OhIO St. 3d 431 (1999).
7. Murray & Murray IS located In Sandusky, OhIO.
8. Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail) v. Wightman, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000).
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Texas, like OhIO, has a $5,000 Individual cap. But unlike OhIO, Texas says, "No
firm can give more than $30,000." Now, you might quibble over whether thirty IS
too high or too low. What they are tryIng to do IS to accommodate a fair balance
between essentially the two sides of so many of those controversies, the plaIntiff s
bar and the defense bar
And the plamtiff's bar IS by and large very small firms. And if you have nothmg
but an mdivldual cap, you are glVlng an enormous advantage to bIg firms and the
bIg firms' candidates.
So, I applaud Texas for leading what should be done, and I would be mterested
m any reactIons any of you would have to whether It IS completely artificIal to put
on, or too close to artificIal to put on, an mdivldual cap wIthout puttmg on also an
aggregate cap.
In the summer of 1999, the Amencan Bar House of Delegates amended the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to add varIOus recommendations With respect to
campaign finance, that there should be, of course, full and effective disclosure, that
there should be contribution limits. They did not mclude the recommendatIOn that
there should be an aggregate for firms, and that IS a gap.
But a good way of makmg sure the limits will be adhered to IS to say that If any
lawyer gIves more than the limit, It IS automatic recusallf the other Side says, "Our
adversaries gave more than the limit. Sorry, Your Honor, good-bye." The Judge
would have to go.
And that, too, IS now m the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The Model Code
has been essentially adopted m somewhere between thIrty-two and thlrty-mne of the
thirty-mne states with Judicial electIOns, I do not know whether It will take ten years
or 100 years before these amendments are adopted m vanous states.
But thIS IS clearly a way that we are movmg. And obViously, the sooner, the
better.
Another one of those provISIons IS that no judge can appomt a lawyer as a speCial
master, guardian, etcetera, if that lawyer has given more than the contribution cap,
unless there are extraordinary circumstances or, of course, If It IS pro bono.
We are not gOIng to get nd of JudiCIal elections. There has been an absolutely
major effort by the Bar and so much more than the Bar at least SInce 1906, and we
have brought the proportIOn of state judges who face. electIOn for some type all the
way down to 87%.
If you take out retention electIOns, you have got 53% of state appellate Judges
facmg contestable electIOns; 77% of trial judges 10 general j unsdiction courts facmg
contestable elections.
At the rate of this 1OO-year effort, we will end JudiCial electIons to the appellate
bench m about 160 years, and for the tnal bench m 770 years.
Now, the great Arthur T Vanderbilt saId, as you have probably all heard a
thousand times, "Judicial reform IS not for the short-wmded." But I thlOk 160 years,
let alone 770, IS a little long. And we have got to focus 10 on campaign finance and
the campaIgn conduct.
One of the best steps we could take would be to lengthen terms. Here 10 OhIO,
you have six-year terms. I Implore your ChIef Justice, and others who agree WIth
hIm, to not put all your energy mto gomg for merit selectIOn, which IS not gomg to
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happen, and to put real energy mto getting that six-year term up to, I would hope,
even ten years, maybe even more than ten.
All by Itself, Just think of lengthemng terms, what that does In the way of
reducmg campaign finance problems, reducmg campaign conduct problems. And
does not It make the Job of bemg a Judge more attractIve') And if the Job IS more
attractIVe, are you not likely to get better people seekmg It and staYing In It?
And Isn't the whole venture about gettmg the best people we can onto the bench?
Thank you.
PROFESSOR DEBOW' Thank you, Professor Schotland. We will hear next from
Jan Baran.
MR. BARAN: Thank you very much. It IS a pleasure to be here. I grew up m
OhiO for a stretch of my life. I lived In Northeast OhiO, and went to school In
Central OhiO. My mother taught at a umverslty campus m Southeastern OhlO.
However, I had never been to thIS quadrant of OhlO. Now I have been here twice
m four weeks to exactly the same place and the same podium. So, I do not know
If thiS IS a Sign that my destmy IS somehow linked to Toledo, OhlO and thIS
particular law school.
I am pleased to be here to address the Issue of campaign finance In the context
ofjudiCIal electIOns. CampaIgn finance IS a subject to which I have devoted almost
thIrty years of my life, both profeSSIOnally and politically I ran a campaIgn for
governor ofMame m 1973 and 1974 that was subject to Mame s campaIgn finance
laws. I went to see the arguments in Buckley v. Valeo 9 in 1975. I spent two years
at the Federal ElectIOn CommIsSIon, and I have been in contmuous pnvate practtce
representmg clients on these types of Issues all over the country smce 1979
ThIS past week, you may have read, we had the second week of debate m the
Umted States Senate regarding the McCam-Femgold Bill. lO A couple of reporters
called me to discuss the legIslatIOn and asked me how 1 felt about It? I saId, "I feel
like a tow-truck operator who has Just learned that there IS a hundred car pile-up on
the mterstate."
(Laughter. )
CampaIgn finance IS such a difficult tOPIC With which to come to gripS because
of the mherent constItutIonal conslderatlOns that present themselves when
attemptmg to regulate campaIgns. 1want to Just summarIze some of the Issues With
which I, along WIth the other members of the Amencan Bar AssoclatlOn's
Commission on Public Financmg of JudiCIal Campaigns, have been grappling. We
have struggled With these Issues because we have been reluctant to propose any
regulatIOn of JudiCIal campaIgn funding unless and until we are comfortable With
the constItutional parameters In domg so.
The constttutlOnal diSCUSSIOn to date stems essentially from the 1976 deCISIon m
Buckley v. Valeo. 1I The subject of the case was the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, as amended m 1974, which was the most comprehenSIVe federal campaign

9. 424 U.S. I (1976).
10. See Bipartisan Campaign Refonn Act of2001, S. 27 I07th Congo (2001).
II. 424 U.S. at I.
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finance reform to have been enacted. 12 The four mam pnnclples of regulatIOn that
were m the Act seem fairly common to us today, but were qUlte new at that time.
The first pnnclple was disclosure. Can the government mandate the disclosure
of how campaign money IS receIved and spent? The Supreme Court saId "yes."
Specifically the Court concluded that the government could reqUIre both campatgn
contributors to be Identified by name and amount contributed, and campaIgn
expenditures to be ItemIzed by reCIpIent and amount.
The second prmclple of regulation was based on whether political contributions
can be limited m amount. The Supreme Court agam said "yes" and upheld the
reasonable limit of$I,OOO for contributIOns to candidates for the House, Senate, or
PresIdent. The Senate, Just thiS past week, you may have read, mcreased that limit
m the McCam-Femgold Bill to $2,000.
This raises the mterestmg question of exactly how much money will George W
Bush raise m 2004 as a sittmg president? Of course, last year, he raised a mere
$105 million under a $1,000 contributIOn limit, and not as a Sitting President of the
UOlted States. And I fear or expect the possibility that m 2004, he might, at the very
least, double the amount that he ralsed m the last election.
The third pnnclple addressed by the Supreme Court was the regulatIOn of
expenditures of money for political purposes. The Act had a spending limIt of
$70,000 on the amount a candidate for the House of Representatives could spend
m a pnmary, and an equal limltation on the amount that could be spent m the
general election. The Supreme Court struck down the limit saymg that although
limits on contributions are stmply margmal mterferences WIth the speech and
assoclatIonal nghts of campaign contributors, a spending limIt IS a direct,
substantial, and unconstitutional mterference with the ability of a candidate's
campaign to commUnIcate With the public and to convey the candidate's message.
This led the Supreme Court to conclude that limItmg the amount of money that an
mdivldual can put mto hiS or her own campaign IS also unconstItutIOnal.
On the other hand, the Court stated that the public funding system that Congress
had deVised for preSIdential campaigns survived constitutional scrutmy because It
was voluntary The Court determmed that If the government deCides to provide
public funds to a candidate, the government can condition the receipt of public
funds on a candidate's agreement not to spend over a certam amount.
Finally, the Buckley Court addressed the pnncIple of mdependent speech. Can
the government regulate speech of mdivlduals who deCide to go out and buy
newspaper ads, publish leaflets, put advertisement on teleVISion or radio? The Act
had a limIt of $1,000 that people could spend, mdependent of a candidate, for a
political message that the Supreme Court defined as a message that expressly
advocated either the election or defeat of a clearly Identified candidate. The Court
struck down thiS limitation, but upheld disclosure reqUIrements for mdependent
speech that contamed the above described express advocacy
The Buckley Court's cIrcumscnptlon of the Act provides the current
constitutIOnal construct WIth respect to regulatmg campaign finance. Now the
McCam-Femgold Bill IS attemptmg to stretch, and perhaps test, some of those
twenty-five year old constructs. For example, there IS a prOVISIOn m the bill that
12. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971)(codified as amended at 2 U.S.c. §§ 431-456 (1994».
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makes It a cnme for a corporatlon, umon, Incorporated trade associatIOn, or any
Incorporated group to pay for advertisIng that either contaInS the name of a
candidate, or the Image of a candidate, dunng a specific penod of time, namely
SIXty days before a general electIOn or thirty days before a pnmary electIOn.
There IS not a whole lot of case law on thiS type of speech regulatIOn. The only
case that comes to my mInd IS Mills v. Alabama. 13 In the early 1960s, the State of
Alabama had passed a statute that prohibited political speech on electIOn day No
one, Including a newspaper, was penmtted to endorse candidates or subsidize or pay
for speech on that one day of the year. The Supreme Court said that thiS prohibition
was unconstitutIOnal under the First Amendment and struck down the statute.
Since then, the Supreme Court has not addressed anythIng approachIng that type
of regulatIOn. There was an attempt In Michigan to prohibIt certaIn types of speech
dunng a specified time penod. I believe It was forty-five days. The restrIction was
promulgated as a regulatIOn, and was struck down by two federal distrIct courts III
Michigan. 14 Withm the last couple of years, there was a SImilar restrIctIon on the
dissemInation of votIng records dunng the SIxty-day tIme penod preceding an
election In West VirgInIa. That prohibItion was also struck down by the distrIct
court m that state. 15
In contrast WIth the approach taken by the McCam-Femgold bill, if we are gomg
to somehow contend WIth the Supreme Court and the ongmal Buckley paradigm,
how IS thIS gomg to potentIally transfer to JudiCIal campaIgns? The first questIOn
that arIses IS, are JudiCial campaigns constItutionally different from campaIgns for
the House, the Senate, or PreSIdent? Is there somethmg umque, or at least
distIngUIshable, about a JudiCIal campaIgn that would allow a type of regulation
that, otherwIse, would not be permItted m a race for the legislature?
The most recent eVidence or case law that we have on thiS questIon arose here m
OhIO. The OhIO Supreme Court Implemented a rule to place a limIt on how much
a candidate for the Supreme Court may spend. Unlike the public finanCIng scheme
that was addressed III Buckley, thIS was a unilateral spending limit, the same as that
which was Imposed by Congress m the Federal ElectIon Campaign Act and
subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court m Buckley The Sixth CirCUIt
Similarly struck down the OhIO Supreme Court limitatIOn as unconstitutIOnal, saymg
that there was no constItutIonal difference between a limit on JudiCial candidate
spending and the spending that was struck down m Buckley So, the mltIal
mdicatlon from the courts, though not the U.S. Supreme Court, IS that there IS
nothmg Significantly different about runmng for state Supreme Court than for
Senator m the State of OhiO that would JustIfy a unilateral spending limit.
The second questIon that arises IS whether contributIOns to JudiCial candidates
can be limited. We have a $5,000 limit on contributIOns to JudiCIal candidates here
m OhiO. That IS very typical of other types oflimlts that are Imposed on legislatIve
races. However, there IS a very major practical conSideratIon here, which IS that the
judges are not really m the same posItIon as IndiVIduals mnmng for Senate. Their
13. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
14. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Miller, 21 F Supp. 2d 740 (£.0. Mich 1998);
RIght to Life of Mich. v. Miller, 23 F Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
15. See West VirgInIans for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F Supp. 1036 (S.D. W Va. 1996).
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constItuency IS much smaller. If you are a Untted States Senator or candidate for
Senate, you presumably will have many many more OhIOans who are mterested In
your race. Therefore, your pool of contributIOns will be larger. On the other hand,
we know from expenence that the likely contributors to a JudiCial race are,
according to Roy, gomg to be lawyers. I mean, your other optIOns are litigants,
Jurors, and people who work at the courthouse. But otherwise, you are dealing
With a much smaller pool of potential contributors.
Third, what about mdependent speech? And thiS IS a hot Issue. We have an
mcreasmg number of examples of mdependent groups that are paymg for
advertlsmg. There have been no allegatIOns that these groups are a part of a
candidate's campaign. In fact, candidates have been growmg frustrated that they
have no control over these groups which are spending more and more money on thiS
type of mdependent speech.
With these Issues illummated m the context ofjudicial races we must then search
for a possible solutIOn. One that we are constantly pomted to IS public funding.
Perhaps public funding will help address many of the constItutIOnal consideratIOns,
as well as help mamtaln JudiCial Independence.
On ItS face, public financmg has a great deal of appeal. Most would agree that
It would be nIce to provide funding for Judicial candidates so they do not have to
raise money, so they do not have to go and seek pnvate support from a relattvely
small pool of potentIal contributors who are likely to be mterested In the JudiCial
system and perhaps the outcome of cases that have to be deCided by these
mdivlduals.
There IS one state that has public funding ofjudictal races, WisconSin, which has
had publicly funded JudiCial races smce 1977 They have encountered some
problems With It, not the least of which IS that It IS very difficult to convmce the
politiCians to fund such a system. AdditIOnally, you heard the Justice thiS mommg
say that she participated m the public funding system last time and received less
than $15,000 m public funding for her campaign. This IS not unusual. The history
at least for the last decade, IS that the candidates generally do not participate In the
public funding system. The good news for the JustIces IS that there has not been an
mcumbentJusttce who has lost m Wisconsm smce 1966. So, It does not seem that
Wisconsm s public funding system presents them With a great rIsk of compromise.
Maybe there IS a lot more to be said about Wisconsm and why public funding
works. Perhaps It IS because of their culture. Maybe they have not had any big
controversies regarding tort reform, abortion, or whatever Issue seems to be stIrrIng
up constItuencies elsewhere.
So, we are lookmg at public funding to see if it IS an optIon. I thmk there IS a big
questIon as to whether or not It will work, even if we can convmce legislatures to
prOVide the funding, even if the limits are large enough. The questIOns remam,
well, what happens If wealthy candidates Wish to run for JustIce, and what effect
will thiS have on mdependent spending by groups who mSlst on havmg somethmg
to say and pay for large amounts of advertlsmg?
Under the Buckley paradigm, a wealthy mdivldual cannot be limited m the
amount of money he or she puts mto a campaign, even a campaign for Supreme
Court Justice.
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Agam, under the current Supreme Court restnctIOns, there IS nothmg that can be
done to curtail or limIt mdependent speech, although there are some deVices that are
bemg proposed 10 some states, whIch would trIgger more public funding for
candidates faced WIth these CIrcumstances.
Finally, one of the Issues that has to be addressed 10 any campaign finance system
IS who IS gomg to regulate all of thIs, and how will thIS apply to JudiCIal campaIgns?
In Buckley, one of the thmgs the Court eventually upheld was an mdependent
agency to regulate federal electIOns. That IS the Federal ElectIOn CommissIOn.
Each state, I believe, now has an ElectIOn CommISSIon to regulate campaIgn
financmg of general electIOns. Most often, they will also have a role 10 regulatmg
the funding of JudiCIal electIOns. However, I thmk thIS regulatory Issue IS more
complex 10 the JudiCIal electIOn context.
We have the orgamzed Bar, which may have a role on occaSIOn. We have the
court Itself, and we have discIplinary commIttees. In that regard, It IS startmg to
look mcreasmgly like the system we have 10 Washmgton, where If you are a
Congressman, you are not only subject to the Federal ElectIon CommISSIon, you
also have the House EthICS Committee that you have to worry about, and you might
even have to deal With the JustIce Department and the Office of Government EthICS.
That IS an outline of the constitutIOnal conSideratIons. As you can tell, I did not
come here WIth any answers. In the year I have spent on the ABA CommiSSIOn,
what we have developed IS great expertIse m Identtfymg all of the questtons. If you
have any apparent solutIons to any of these questIOns, we would all like to hear
them. Thank you.
PROFESSOR DEBOW' Thank you, Jan. Our final speaker today IS JustIce Enoch,
and that will be followed by your questIons.
JUSTICE ENOCH: Thank you, Mike, and good afternoon. Thanks for the
opportumty to be here. I guess I am umquely qualified to be talkmg about campaIgn
finance reform smce 10 my two races 10 Texas I raIsed, for Just my race, over $3.6
million. And so, now, let us talk about limItmg that campaIgn fundraIsmg that I
have.
(Laughter.)
I thmk It IS faIr to say that the public IS conflicted over ItS relatIonshIp WIth ItS
Judges. At once the public wants Its Judges to be mdependent, but also accountable.
And I call that a conflict because I suggest mdependence and accountability are
necessarily concepts 10 tenSIOn. And we have heard that earlier today
In fact, I would suggest they are polar oPPosItes. James Madison, one of the
founders of the Federalist movement, mSIsted that a system of mdependent courts
would be an Impenetrable bulwark of liberty
And JustIce Clarence Thomas argues that It IS JudiCIal unaccountability that
fosters Impartiality and adherence to the rule of law, even when do 109 so, stands 10
oppOSItion to the popular WIshes.
Now, assume WIth me, If you will, that our diSCUSSIons today SImply recognIze
the reality ofthls conflict of these Ideals, that what we are ImpliCitly acknowledgmg
IS that we want our Judges to be mdependent, but Just not too mdependent. And we
want our Judges to be accountable, but Just not too accountable.
Perhaps 1 could be a little bit more pomted. Are we not really saymg, "I want my
judge to be mdependent to them, but I want my Judge to be accountable to me?"
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In the mld-l 970s, Texas tned to rewnte Its constitutIOn. And the Judicial section
established ment selectIOn retentIOn electIOn for the judges. The State's party
platform for the Republican Party of Texas called for that proposal. And that
provIsion has disappeared from the platform.
Now I cannot say, for a fact, why that happened. But my educated guess IS
because shortly thereafter, Republican Judges started gett10g elected to the Bench.
Their judges started 10s1Og, and our judges started w1Omng.
So, let us look at the Texas expenence. We have been elect10g Judges on a
partisan ballot for over 100 years. To say that these electIOns, because Texas was
a one-party state for most of that time, were non-partisan IS really not correct.
There were tremendous battles wlthm the Democratic Party the conservatIve
populist and liberal Democrats.
Also, It IS misleading to say that the judges 10 Texas are elected. Upwards of
80% of judges came to the bench by gubernatonal appo1Otment. And I have heard
that 80% of those, if they had a pnmary opponent In their very first electIOn, never
had another electIOn until their retirement.
Now, because of the evolv1Og two-party state we have, we have a few more
contests. But the percentage of the retamedJudges still holds at about 60%, maybe
a little bit above It.
In short, Texas has an appo1Otment retentIOn system. It IS Just that the
appo1Otment IS ad hoc, and a retention election IS open to Influences that have
noth1Og to do With the ments of the judge.
Let us talk about reform. The quality of the Judge s deCISion IS very hard to
measure. In fact, I suggest to you It cannot be measured. It may be an
overSimplification, but It seems to me that only lawyers care why a court ruled the
way It did. The public only cares about what the court's ruling IS.
Now, It was Interestmg, the last session that was here, I kInd of enjoyed It. You
know, the First Amendment, tell It like It IS. More InformatIOn IS better.
We have a little bit of a debate gomg on. What IS the role of the judges and what
should they say? If you are go1Og to elect them, then let them say everythmg.
But then, the speakers all sort of agreed there are some thIngs judges should not
say, nght? Well, these views are legal nIceties. I am telling you, the public does
not care about your reasons for your deCISion; they only care what you deCided.
And I suggest 10 the electIOn of judges, why wouldn't the public be entItled to
demand of the judge how they are gOIng to rule In a particular case because what
else are you elect10gthejudges for? What else do you elect judges for except to be
your representatIve on the Bench; to elect our Judges, as opposed to their Judges?
I thInk It IS a legal nIcety to say that an Issue may come before me, and therefore,
I cannot comment on It. But if a voter cannot get your commitment, what else are
you askmg for theIr vote for?
Now, I'm glv10g you the extreme because of my campaign In 1992. That was the
pOSitIOn of my opponent. My opponent said that he had a constituency and he had
been elected to represent hIS constituency on the Court. I challenged him In that
electIOn, and I won, though Republicans were not w1On1Og stateWide In Texas.
The questIOn was asked earlier today, why do we see all thiS money gett10g In
these state JudiCial races? I suggest to you an answer New federalism. ThiS IS not
New Federalism of Justice Brennen who encouraged state supreme courts to look
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at their state constitutions for gUIdance on personal liberties. I am talkmg about the
fact that the Untted States Supreme Court IS now saymg that "Not every Issue
deserves a natIOnal solutIOn. We want to see what the states are gomg to decide."
Let's look at tort refonn both m Congress and state legislatures, major battles over
tort reform are occurnng. Because state legislatures have been more actIve, the
state supreme courts are where the action IS.
For example, pumtive damages IS a big Issue both m the busmess communtty and
the plamttff's bar. And legislative limits on pumtIve damages are bemg mterpreted
m the state courts. Also class actions, that started out as a federal rule, are now
recogmzed m all state rules.
Many state cases that used to be tned as mdivldual cases now are bemg brought
as class actIOns m the state courts. That means there IS a lot of money on the line.
I served on a Texas Intennediate appellate court m Dallas. It dealt with both civil
and cnmmal appeals. I came to that court from a civil tnal bench. But a good
fnend and colleague of mme came to that court from a cnmmal distrIct bench. One
of the very first arguments he handled was m a civil case. And the lawyers almost
came to blows dunng their argument. My colleague said, "Walt, walt, walt, where' s
the dead body? I mean, there s no dead body m thiS case. There were no fireanns
used. What's the big deal?" But I explamed later to my colleague, "you Just don't
understand; It's always money"
I suggest that the reason there IS more money gomg mto the state races IS because
these courts deal, day m and day out, wIth big Issues mvolvmg both the plamtiff's
bar and the defense bar. And how the state supreme court rules means real dollars
to them and theIr clients.
And to Mr. Hantler-he was here earlier, I may have mIssed him now-he said
he was all m favor of the electIon of Judges and he works With Datmler Chrysler.
And I was tempted to say, "Show me the money"
That IS really the truth. The truth IS that, If you are gomg to have an election of
Judges, then the Judges are gomg to have to get theIr message out. And to get theIr
message out, they are gomg to have to be able to have access to resources necessary
to pay for theIr messages' dissemmatton.
In Texas, there are more population centers of 100,000 10 varIOUS parts of the
state than any other place m the country There are sixteen major media markets.
Dallas, Ft. Worth, and Houston only have 60% of the vote. If I am gomg to
campaIgn stateWide, It will take me $600,000 to $800,000 Just for two weeks ofTY
publiCity
And assummg It takes a doBar to earn a dollar, then It costs $1.6 million to run
Just a two-week campaIgn m Texas If you want to have an effect on the voter.
So then, let me talk about campaign contributIons. I became a Judge and subject
to electIon at a tIme when Texas had no limits on campaign contributIOns. By the
tIme I got to the court of appeals, the notIOn that Judges might set voluntary limits
on contributIons as a JudiCIal refonn was gammg steam. It resonated With a
commumty that wanted you to be accountable, but not too accountable, that wanted
you to be mdependent, but not too mdependent.
Campaign contributIOn limits sent a middle of the road message. Essentially we
recognized that we had to raIse campaign contributIOns, but we agreed to not let any
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one mdivldual gIVe us so much money that It would raise the specter that we might
be mfluenced 10 our JudicIal deCISIOns.
I set mme at a pretty low limit. IrOnIcally, I then raised more money than I had
ever raised before. It turned out that by settmg a limit, people actually started
glVmg more money to my campaign. That was not too bad!
Also, one of the very effective thmgs about a campaign contributIOn limit IS It
reqUIres you to have a much broader base of support. One goal of mme was to have
less than half of my money come from the lawyers, more than half from other
sources than lawyers. By havmg a campaign contribution limit, you almost assure
that you could not raise the money necessary 10 Texas to run an effective campaign
Without haVIng to reach out to other members of the commumty for contributIOns.
But here IS a rub. When I first started runnIng as aJudge, campaign contributions
from lawyers did not bother me. I reasoned that I saw these lawyers day 10 and day
out, and they won some and lost some. So I did not sense any particular concern
about anyone case. On the other hand, one day, I got a contribution 10 the mail, and
then a second contributIOn. I did not recognize the names. Because I did not know
who these people were, It sent off warnmg bells. Even my court admmlstrator, who
knew all the lawyers 10 town, didn't recognize the names so I Just held the checks.
About two days later, I was prepanng for a hearIng and whoa, the contributors were
parties 10 the heanng. I sent the money back.
The Irony of all of this IS that 10 Texas today, if you qUIz the public, they will tell
you that they thmk the worst thmg a Judge can do IS take contributIons from
lawyers. The best thmg a Judge can do IS take contributIOns from mdivlduals.
Well, okay So, half of my contributIOns are from lawyers, half are from
mdivlduals. So, now I bother both myself and the public. I guess that IS Just the
way the system works. There IS another thmg about voluntary contribution limits
that I would suggest to you. By makIng them you have to reach out for a broader
base of support, I find that people get a lot more mterested 10 your campaIgn.
If you can get somebody to put that two dollar bet down on the horse race, they
have a much stronger mterest 10 seemg the race through. There are those who say,
"the nch can buy the electIOns if you have campaign contributIOn limits, because
only they will have the funds necessary to WIn." And sometimes, that happens. But
more often than not, It seems to me that you can create a tremendously broad base
of support by smaller contributIOns. Dunng the early part of George Bush's
campaIgn, as he was gearIng up, there was a lot of the natIOnal media giVIng him
very little credit for what he was able to do.
But there was a little statistIc out there that I thought was very telling. At one
pomt In hIS campaign, $60 million or somethIng was the mark he had reached, hIS
average contribution was $500.
There was a lot of press gIven to hIS raIsIng huge amounts of money But if hIS
average contributIOn was $500, Just thInk how many people bet on that horse race.
And It seems to me that IS what pulled him through.
Are Judges different than other politiCIans? Another questIOn I heard. The
answer IS yes, I thmkJudges are different. If! am runlllng for the legIslature, If! am
runnIng for governor, I can tell you, "ThiS IS my agenda. I am for strong education.
I am gomg to pay the teachers more. I am gomg to reduce your taxes. I am gOIng
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to reduce the property tax. Now, if you agree With me, contribute to my campaign
so I can go sell my name to all these people, get my message out, and I can wm."
On the other hand, can ajudge address school finance because It IS an Important
Issue for hiS or her constituency? With a school finance case pending, can a voter
ask how are you gomg to rule? What can a judge say but "I'm sorry I can't answer
that questIOn. That's a case that might come pending before me, and I've got to
obey the law Now, how about contributmg to my campaign so I can be elected to
the bench?"
That IS the difference, It seems to me, between judges and people who are elected
to the legislative or executive branches.
For all of the First Amendment diSCUSSIOn about electIOn versus appomtment, I
thmk all of thiS today really focuses on just a central notIOn. The public wants the
judges to be accountable, but just not too accountable. And they want the Judges
to be mdependent, but Just not too mdependent.
QUESTION & ANSWER
PROFESSOR DEBOW· Thanks, Justice Enoch. Time for questions. I will
paraphrase your questions from thiS microphone. So, the more succmct you are, the
more accurate I will be m repeatmg your question.
Okay, a two-part questIOn: What about these specific forms of Judicial
candidates' approach to a potential contributor? And secondly, what sort of
enforcement action would be appropnate m cases where the rules are not followed?
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: There are only four states m which judges are
completely free to directly SOliCit, mduding Texas and California. And I do not
remember the other two states. Everywhere else, It must be done by a committee.
And maybe I am just a formalist, but I thmk there IS a slgmficant case for trymg
to build that bit of insulatIOn between the judge and the fundrmsmg.
I thmk It IS also very Important to be very realistic. I know, In fact, that often the
fundralser SitS nght there, and the fundralsmgjudge Sits nght there. And the only
question IS, who happens to get to the person first?
And the Judge IS saymg, "Do I now say thank you for your support, or do I say
I sure hope you can support." And the fundralser lS saymg, "We really would like
if you could send It."
I remember an Arkansas Intermediate Appellate woman judge who was Just the
exemplary, splendid judge, who said, "You know, I really never looked at anythmg
about who gave. It doesn't come to my desk. I don't look at the reports. I go out
of my way to make sure I don't know who gave. They come up to me at Bar pICnICS
and they tell me."
PROFESSOR DEBOW· A question about the McCam-Femgold proposalMR. BARAN: McCam-Femgold takes a multifaceted approach. In additIOn to
bannmg certam types of advertlsmg by certam groups pnor to an electIOn, It also
reqUires disclosure by mdivlduals, or groups of mdivlduals, who are not
mcorporated and who run advertlsmg dunng certam penods of tlme. So, If a
wealthy mdivldual wanted to pay for an ad that did not expressly name or expressly
advocate the electIOn or the defeat of a clearly Identified candidate, but discussed
a particular candidate by name, then he or she would have to file a report With the
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Federal ElectIOn Conunlsston. All of us 10 Washmgton are trymg to figure out how
thiS IS gomg to work.
Furthermore, If McCain-Feingold passes, the first thmg we all know IS gomg to
happen IS that groups are gomg to try and figure out what kInd of advertlsmg they
can fmance WIthOut bemg subject to McCa1O-F e1Ogold' s prohibItIons and disclosure
requIrements.
But I thmk I have come up With an ad that might be okay if this regime became
law. It would be somethmg along the lines of a pIcture of an mdivldual's profile,
like one of those old eighteenth century silhouettes, With a question mark on It. The
message would be: "There IS a Congressman who supports public funding of
abortIOns. Now, we can't tell you the name of that Congressman, or show you the
Congressman's picture, because thiS Congressman also voted for a bill that would
make It a cnme for us to do so. But we think we can give you hiS phone number."
(Laughter.)
MR. BARAN: "So, why don't you call that person, who we are by law not allowed
to Identify, and ask him why he IS do1Og that." That IS, I thmk, what we are gOing
to be reduced to.
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: May I Just pick up on Chief Justice Keith's usmg the
words of how McCam-Femgold will work, and make a not bold predictIOn?
If you could buy stock m state parties, I would buy a lot nght now because a lot
of money will flow to the state parties if we keep It from flowmg to the natIonal.
PROFESSOR DEBOW· Other questIons? The questIon IS about sort of a
transparency, I guess, of candidates who are supposedly non-partisan ralsmg funds.
PROFESSOR SCHOTLAND: This IS the first thmg that the JustIce has said that I
could take any Issue With. The leading troublemakmg campaign pitch by JudiCial
candidates IS "Tough on crune." And we have It 10 all forms. We have It m not all
states, but an awful lot.
One of the reasons he and hiS colleagues look so good IS they do not have any
cnmmal cases. They sent that over to another court, so they can be real JudiCial
statesmen, and they are, In fact, real JudiCial statesmen. It speaks very well of
PreSident Bush, the appomtments, the kmd of appoIntments he made to that Court
when he was Governor.
We had somebody rurmmg down m Houston, MarlOn Bloss. She ran an ad, "You
do the cnme, you do the tIme." Tough Marlon.
And by the way, she put the picture of her opponent m the bottom of the ad. Why
would anybody put a picture of an opponent In their own campaign ad? Well, if you
want to get blunt about It, It IS racism. They put m pictures of black opponents.
And some put pictures of Latino opponents.
We had a fellow m Nevada, an Incumbent Supreme Court Justice, who
campaigned through the state arm and arm With the Attorney General. And they
were on a tough on cnme platform. Later, there was an effort to have that Justice
recuse himself. All of his colleagues, except one, the Chief, agreed he did not have
to recuse himself.
The Chief wrote an absolutely beautiful, blistenng dissent. So, I am afraid I
cannot go along With the propOSition that JudiCial candidates do not go out and say
"tough on cnme." That IS the leading, smgle bad problem.
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Let me try to tum thIS to a happy event. There was a wonderful epIsode m Cook
County, WhICh has eIther a weekly or bIweekly Cook County Insh newspaper. In
Cook, as m many other places, the best thmg IS an Insh name, as mentIOned earlier.
But a fellow named O'Riley was runnmg. And he ran a half-page ad, "O'Riley"
for whatever It IS. And he, m fact, gets elected. And after the electIOn, he runs
another ad, except thIs IS a full-page one.
And he has a great bIg pIcture of hIS very happy smiling black face saymg,
"Thank you, brothers and sIsters."
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